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In the past three decades researchers have developed several tasks to measure theory of mind 
in young children. The current study administered one nonverbal theory of mind task and five 
verbal theory of mind tasks to a group of three-year-olds and a group of four-year-olds in 
order to investigate (1) how they perform on a nonverbal transfer task, (2) how the different 
verbal theory of mind tasks relate to each other, and (3) how the nonverbal transfer task 
relates to the verbal theory of mind tasks. The nonverbal theory of mind task was modified in 
a way that controlled children from passing this task by making three-way associations, using 
the behavioural rule that people look for objects where they last saw them, and using the 
situational cue of the actor disappearing from the scene to help predict the actor’s behaviour. 
Results showed that both three- and four-year-olds changed their looking behaviour based on 
the beliefs of the actor in the nonverbal transfer task. Results furthermore showed that the 
different verbal theory of mind tasks used in this study were related to each other, and that 
some of these tasks were more difficult to pass than others. In addition, this study found that 
the nonverbal transfer task did not correlate to any of the verbal theory of mind tasks. Based 
on the results of the theory of mind tasks administered, it was argued that three- and four-
year-olds have already developed a theory of mind, but fail more difficult theory of mind 
tasks because of task difficulties not related to theory of mind, most likely information-
processing demands.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Historical perspective on theory of mind research  
 
Piaget was one of the first to investigate the child’s understanding of the mind (e.g. 1929). He 
believed that young children, unlike older children and adults, do not understand the nature of 
thought (Piaget, 1929). Now, almost 80 years later, the child’s understanding of the mind is 
still a lively area of cognitive developmental research (e.g. Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; 
Sodian & Thoermer, 2008). Research in this field, now known as the child’s theory of mind, 
became especially popular early 1980s after Premack and Woodruff (1978) published a paper 
in which they claimed to have found evidence that chimpanzees have a theory of mind. They 
defined theory of mind as an ability to impute mental states—desires, emotions, beliefs, 
intentions and other inner states involved in human action—to self and others. Following this 
paper an experimental paradigm was developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983) that could test 
the presence of a theory of mind in children. Theory of mind is an important topic of research 
as the ability to impute mental states to others is indispensable when making sense of people’s 
behavior, and consequently essential for social life (Wellmann, 1990). 
 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) choose to call theory of mind a ‘theory’ for two reasons, first, 
because mental states are not directly observable and, second, because predictions can be 
made about the behavior of other persons with help of this system. For those reasons the 
theory of mind is very akin to a scientific theory where the child uses rules to determine the 
content of one’s own and other person’s minds. To determine the content of another person’s 
mind the child has to be able to understand that other people hold beliefs about the world 
around them, and that these beliefs control their actions (Dennett, 1978). Although it seems 
simple to test this, in practice it is somewhat complicated to determine the presence of a 
theory of mind in children. For example, one cannot simply ask the child about another 
person’s true beliefs. As Mitchell (1996) explains; if a child is shown a candy box and asked 
what another person believes is inside the box, the child will probably correctly respond by 
saying “candy”. However, one cannot say for certain that the child has an understanding of 
the other person’s mind based on these results. It could as well be the case that the child 
reports its own view of reality and not the beliefs of the other person, which would result in a 
similar answer. To test whether a child has a theory of mind it is therefore necessary to 
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employ a task in which the other person’s beliefs are incongruent with reality; a so-called 
false belief task. An example of such a false belief task is a task designed by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983), here named the traditional transfer task.  
 
1.2 The traditional transfer task 
 
In a famous study, Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed and tested a transfer task that was 
designed to determine the presence of a theory of mind in young children. In this study 
children were told a story that was enacted with dolls. In the story, a doll puts an object at a 
certain location and then leaves. Another doll then enters the scene, moves the object to 
another location and leaves again. The first doll returns to the scene and the experimenter asks 
the child to predict where the first doll will look for the object. To pass this test, children need 
to realize that the first doll does not act in accordance with reality, but in accordance with a 
mental representation of the world. Beside this, the child also needs to ignore its own 
representation of the world and predict the doll’s actions based on its false representation. The 
results of this study showed that less than half of the four-year-olds tested answered correctly 
to this question while almost all six-year-olds answered correctly. From these results, the 
authors concluded that somewhere between the period of four to six years of age children 
develop a cognitive skill that allows them to understand that other people have beliefs and 
predict the actions of another person based on these beliefs. However, the failure of younger 
children on this test does not undoubtedly prove that younger children do not possess a theory 
of mind; there might be other reasons why younger children fail this test.  
 
Problems with the traditional transfer task. There are several problems associated with the 
traditional transfer task. The first problem is that this task requires children to remember many 
details associated with the task, such as the first location of the hidden object and whether the 
protagonist saw the object being hidden or not. Young children might fail the traditional 
transfer test because they have a weaker memory than older children and therefore forget past 
thoughts, resulting in an incorrect prediction on the task. The second problem with the 
traditional transfer task is that, in order to pass the task, a certain level of linguistic 
competence is required of the children. It could be the case for instance that younger children 
misinterpret the test question ‘Where will he look for the object?’ as a request from the 
experimenter to help the protagonist find the object. The third problem with the traditional 
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transfer task is that the test is generally performed with inanimate objects that do not have 
minds. The reason that younger children fail the traditional transfer test might be a result of 
them not attributing a ‘mind’ to these inanimate objects while older children do. This is not 
the same as saying that younger children do not have a theory of mind at all; they might 
simply not apply it to inanimate objects such as dolls. A study by Perner, Leekam, and 
Wimmer (1987) investigated whether younger children fail the traditional transfer task 
because they have not sufficiently developed their memory yet. They showed that many 
younger children who remembered the main events of the story still made wrong belief 
attributions. These results suggest that younger children do not fail the traditional transfer task 
because they forget what has occurred in the story. They also investigated whether younger 
children fail the traditional transfer task because they misinterpret the test question. Results 
showed that changing the format of the test question in the traditional transfer task to make it 
less ambiguous did not increase correct response rates. A meta-analysis by Wellman, Cross, 
and Watson (2001) confirmed that the phrasing of the question in the traditional transfer test 
(using ‘look’, ‘think/believe’, ‘say’, ‘know’, or adding the temporal marker ‘first’) did not 
influence children’s responses. However, it might still be the case that younger children have 
problems with the traditional transfer task because, in order pass it, children need to have a 
certain level of linguistic competence, regardless of how the question is phrased.  
 
1.3 Other verbal theory of mind tasks 
 
The traditional transfer task was developed to measure theory of mind in children, however, 
many other tasks have also been used to measure theory of mind in children. Some of these 
tasks were developed to overcome the problems of the traditional transfer task described 
above, others were designed to test different theory of mind abilities. The verbal tasks that are 
used in this study to measure theory of mind and theory of mind related abilities are described 
below.  
 
The non-animated transfer task. Melinder, Endestad, and Magnusssen (2006) developed a 
non-animated transfer task very similar in design to the verbal transfer task. In this task the 
child is presented with a wallet containing money and an empty milk box. The experimenter 
moves the money from the wallet to the milk box and subsequently asks the child where he or 
she thinks another child, that has not seen the money being transferred to the milk box, will 
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look for the money. This task does not require the child to attribute a ‘mind’ to an inanimate 
object, but to another child and differs therefore from the traditional transfer task. Another 
difference is that in the non-animated transfer task the other child is never present at the 
scene, it is therefore not necessary to remember what this other child did or did not see to pass 
the task, which is necessary in the traditional transfer task. Results of this study showed that 
74 percent of the 4-, 5-, and 6-year olds predicted correctly that the child would search for the 
money in the wallet, suggesting that they understand that other people can have false beliefs. 
However, as the study did not report the responses to the non-animated transfer task per age 
group, further research is needed to investigate the exact age at which children generally pass 
this task.  
 
The unexpected content task. Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) designed an unexpected 
content task to test the presence of a theory of mind in young children. In this task children 
are presented with a container and asked what they believe is in there, they are then shown 
that the container has another content than expected and asked what they believed was in the 
container before the experimenter opened it and what they believe another person, who has 
not seen the content, will think is in the container. The unexpected content task is similar to 
the non-animated transfer task in that it does not require children to make predictions about 
the beliefs of a doll or other inanimate object. It differs from the non-animated transfer task in 
that it requires children to think about their own past false belief as well as another person’s 
false belief. Generally, results show that most three-year-olds fail this task, while older 
children pass this task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). The finding that three-year-olds generally 
fail this task supports the idea that younger children do not fail the traditional transfer task 
because they have difficulty attributing beliefs to inanimate objects; they also fail false belief 
tasks that require children to attribute false beliefs to themselves and other persons. 
 
The appearance-reality task. The traditional transfer task and the unexpected content tasks 
suggest that children below the age of four lack a theory of mind. Similarly, three-year-olds 
children appear to have difficulties in distinguishing between reality and appearance. Several 
experiments have been developed in the past to investigate whether children can distinguish 
between reality and appearance (Flavell, 1986; Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1983). Generally, in 
these experiments children are shown deceptive objects that appear to look like one thing but 
really are something else (such as a sponge that looks like a rock) and are then asked what the 
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object really is and what it looks like. Although some three-year-olds pass these appearance-
reality tasks, many fail it, answering that the object is really a sponge and also looks like a 
sponge. Older children generally do better on these appearance-reality tasks, answering 
correctly that the object looks like a sponge, but is really a rock. These studies show that 
children below the age of four have difficulty distinguishing between reality and appearance. 
Being able to make this distinction is very important for the development of a theory of mind 
because in order to understand other people’s beliefs one needs to be able to understand that 
the same event can be represented differently by different people. The results of the 
appearance-reality task suggest that children below the age of four might fail false belief tasks 
such as the traditional transfer task because they are unable to hold two different 
representations of an event or object simultaneously. 
 
The perspective taking task. Another theory of mind related task is the perspective taking task. 
The ability to take another person’s perspective is vital to the development of a theory of 
mind, because, to understand the beliefs of another person, one needs to be able to understand 
that another person’s beliefs can be different from one’s own. Without this ability one’s own 
beliefs would be interfering when making judgments about another person’s beliefs. Children 
below the age of four may fail theory of mind tasks because they lack this ability. Although 
there are many variations to the perspective taking task, the child is generally presented with 
an image or object which is then placed in such a way that the child cannot see the object or 
image, but the experimenter can. The child is then asked whether the experimenter can see the 
object. To answer correctly, the child has to ignore his or her own perspective and take the 
perspective of the experimenter. This type of perspective taking has been referred to as “level-
1” perspective taking and is generally passed by most three-year-olds and some two-year olds 
(Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981; Melinder, Endestad, & Magnussen, 2006). These 
studies suggest that the ability to take another person’s perspective generally develops just 
before children start to pass other theory of mind tasks. 
 
Summary of the verbal theory of mind tasks. Although many studies have used verbal theory 
of mind tasks to investigate theory of mind in young children, there is still much to learn on 
how these tasks are exactly related to each other. When looking at theory of mind, many 
studies combine the scores of different theory of mind tasks into a composite theory of mind 
score (e.g. Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Baird, 
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Cox, & Drew, 2000). However, the relationship between these different tasks has still not 
been mapped out completely. More research comparing these different tasks is therefore 
needed.    
 
1.4 Nonverbal theory of mind tasks 
 
Up until the mid 1990’s researchers investigating the presence of a theory of mind in young 
children often changed the traditional transfer task to demonstrate earlier competence and to 
find out why younger children failed this task. However, when changing the traditional 
transfer task, for instance by overtly stating the beliefs of the protagonist, there is always the 
possibility that the task measures a different concept than the original task. Clements and 
Perner (1994) therefore decided to design an experiment that could demonstrate knowledge of 
beliefs in young children, while using the same traditional transfer task. They administered 
the traditional transfer task to a group of children, but besides asking them where they 
believed the protagonist would search for the object, they also recorded where the children 
looked during the crucial moment in the story. Results showed that three-year-olds looked at 
the correct location in the task, showing an implicit understanding of belief, but lacked an 
explicit understanding of beliefs as they gave the wrong answer to the test question. Based on 
these predictive looking results, Clements and Perner (1994) concluded that three-year-olds 
must have some kind of implicit knowledge of false beliefs. In other words, children around 
the age of three have some kind of understanding of false beliefs, but cannot use that 
knowledge yet to make an explicit, elicited-response. 
 
After the study of Clements and Perner (1994) was published, other researchers also started to 
use nonverbal tasks to test false belief understanding in young children. For instance, 
Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) used a nonverbal transfer task to investigate whether 
two-year-olds were able to attribute mental states to other people. In their experiment they had 
a group of two-year-olds look at an actor that was positioned behind two boxes. An object 
was moved from one location to another in such a way that the actor falsely believed that the 
object was hidden in one of the containers. Results showed that a large majority of the two-
year-olds gazed to the container where the actor believed the object was hidden, even though 
the children had seen that the object was actually positioned in the other location. These 
results suggest that children as young as two-years-old already attribute false beliefs to others. 
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One possible explanation why children at this age pass these nonverbal tasks, but fail the 
traditional transfer task is that children at this age have a theory of mind, but do not have the 
linguistic competency to understand and respond correctly to the test question of this task. 
Another explanation, given by Clements and Perner (1994), is that the verbal task requires a 
judgment while the nonverbal task is nonjudgmental. They argue that giving an elicited-
response requires the child to make an explicit judgment, while giving a spontaneous response 
(by looking at a direction) does not, which could increase the tasks difficulty and might be a 
reason why younger children fail the verbal, but not the nonverbal transfer task. 
 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) tested even younger children, namely 15-month-old infants on 
a nonverbal transfer task. During this task 15-month-old infants were shown an actor 
positioned behind two boxes. An object was moved in such a way that the actor held either a 
true or false belief about the position of the object. The actor then reached into one of the 
boxes, either into the one the actor believed the object was, or into the opposite one. They 
argued that children with a theory of mind would expect the actor to search in the location 
where the actor believed the object was. They furthermore argued that these children would 
look longer at the scene when the actor did not act according to its beliefs. This study is 
different in design from that of Clements and Perner (1997) and Southgate et al. (2007) in that 
it does not analyze where children anticipate the actor to search. Instead, the study 
investigates children’s looking behavior when their expectations are violated. Results showed 
that the infants in the study looked longer at the scene when the actor did not act according to 
its beliefs, suggesting that they expected the actor to search at the location where it believed 
the object was hidden and not where the object was actually located. Based on these results 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) proposed that children are born with an innate ability to use 
other people’s beliefs to make sense of human behavior. 
 
Alternative explanations for the nonverbal transfer task results. The results of the study by 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) started a debate on the validity of nonverbal transfer tasks and 
the existence of an innate theory of mind module in infants. Perner and Ruffman (2005) 
argued that the results of Onishi and Baillargeon’s study did not proof that infants can 
attribute false beliefs to other people because their results could be interpreted differently. The 
first alternative explanation they proposed was that infants might create a three-way 
association between the actor, object, and location. According to this theory, children look 
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shorter at the scene when the configuration between the actor, object, and location is similar 
to a configuration they have just witnessed. They argued that in these cases, children would 
look shorter at the scene because a similar combination would require less processing, and 
consequently a shorter looking time. The looking time results in the study by Onishi and 
Baillargeon were consisted with this three-way association theory and could therefore account 
for why younger children looked longer at the scene when the actor did not act according to 
its beliefs. According to this alternative explanation infants do not need to be able to 
understand false beliefs to pass this task, they only need to be able to form three-way 
associations. The results of the study by Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) cannot be 
interpreted with help of the three-way association theory, because they used a predictive 
looking paradigm, recording the looking direction of the children in order to investigate where 
they expected the actor to search. This is recorded before the actor attends to either one of the 
locations and consequently any three-way associations formed do not influence the child’s 
looking behavior at this time. 
 
The second alternative explanation Perner and Ruffman (2005) proposed was that infants 
might use a behavioral rule, namely that people look for an object where they last saw it. This 
only requires the infant to understand that people who see an object at a location will search 
for it there and people who do not see an object at a location will not search for it there. The 
looking behavior results of the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) and Southgate et al. 
(2007) are both consisted with this behavioral rule and could therefore account for their 
results. Using this rule does not require infants to understand that the actor has a false belief in 
its mind; they can simply apply it without any awareness of the existence of a mind.  
 
A third alternative explanations proposed by Sodian and Thoermer (2008) is that infants 
predict the actions of an actor in nonverbal theory of mind tasks by using situational cues. 
They performed a study with 16-month-old infants that showed that infants’ action 
predictions in nonverbal theory of mind tasks are based on the actor’s presence or absence in 
the scene, regardless of whether this presence or absence influenced the beliefs of the actor. 
These results indicate that children might use the situational cue of the actor leaving the 
scene, and not necessarily the actor’s beliefs, to predict the actor’s behavior in nonverbal 
transfer tasks. This could explain the findings of the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), 
however, not the findings of the study by Southgate et al. (2007) as the actor in this study 
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does not disappear from the scene during the belief induction phase, it only turns around. All 
of these critiques have to be taken in mind when using a nonverbal task to measure theory of 
mind in order to ensure that children do not pass the task by other means than applying a 
theory of mind.  
 
There are still those that believe the results of the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) do 
demonstrate that 15-month-old infants have a theory of mind and that critics give up the 
possibility that infants understand false beliefs too quickly. Leslie (2005), for instance, argues 
that evolving the behavioral rule that people look for an object where they last saw it has no 
advantage in human evolution. Csibra and Southgate (2005) also replied to the arguments of 
Perner and Ruffman by stating that there is currently not enough evidence to assume that 
infants are capable of making three-way associations. However, as it is still not clear whether 
infants and children use these three alternative ways to pass the nonverbal transfer task, it is 
still unknown whether infants and younger children possess an implicit theory of mind. What 
is therefore needed is a nonverbal transfer task that cannot be passed by other means than 
using a theory of mind. 
 
1.5 Comparing verbal and nonverbal theory of mind measures  
 
To my awareness, there exists only one study that has compared nonverbal and verbal 
answers of normally developing children on a specific theory of mind task (e.g. Clements & 
Perner, 1994). That study suggested that an implicit, nonverbal, theory of mind develops at an 
earlier age than an explicit, verbal theory of mind. However, it is still largely unknown how 
nonverbal theory of mind tasks relate to verbal theory of mind tasks. Because more and more 
researchers are using nonverbal theory of mind tasks to measure theory of mind in young 
children it is important to enhance our understanding of how the nonverbal and verbal theory 
of mind tasks are related. 
 
1.6 The developmental progress of theory of mind 
 
In addition to researching at what age theory of mind develops, it is also interesting to 
investigate how it develops. There are general two main views as to how theory of mind 
develops. The first view is the traditional view, known as the cognitive deficit theory, which 
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states that children do not develop a theory of mind until they begin to understand that 
external reality can be represented internally (Perner, 1991). The cognitive deficit theory 
claims that once children begin to understand that reality can be represented internally, they 
swiftly move to a stage where they can represent beliefs. According to this stage theory, 
children do not have a theory of mind before they reach this ‘theory of mind’ stage.  
 
The second view has emerged later and is called the modular theory of theory of mind, and 
states that theory of mind has a specific innate basis (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). According to 
this theory, children do not develop a theory of mind through one or more stages, but posses a 
theory of mind module that enables a person to represent mental states (Scholl & Leslie, 
1999). This theory claims that younger children fail false belief tasks not because they are not 
able to attribute false beliefs to others, but because they have not developed themselves 
enough in other areas. One such area which has been proposed to limit young children’s 
performance on theory of mind tasks is selection processing. It has been suggested that young 
children understand false beliefs, but are not able to choose the right content for the belief yet 
(Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Because beliefs generally tend to be in line with reality, ‘true’ beliefs 
are more salient and prioritized. Without an ‘inhibitor’ to adjust this automatic assignment of 
true beliefs to others in cases where a person holds a false belief, true beliefs will be assigned 
in all cases (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). As a consequent, younger children will always attribute a 
true belief to another person and fail theory of mind tasks.  
 
Besides these two main theories of theory of mind, there are also some other intermediary 
theories, such as the ‘theory theory’ which states that theory of mind develops through several 
phases (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). This theory falls somewhere in between the other two as 
it states that theory of mind abilities already emerge before children pass the traditional 
transfer task, however, at the same time it describes theory of mind development as a process 
that occurs through stages, and not as an innate ability. Further research is needed in order to 
get a better comprehension of how children develop a theory of mind, how other theory of 
mind related abilities develop, and what the influence of these abilities are on the 
development of theory of mind.  
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2. The aim of this study 
 
This study will present one nonverbal theory of mind task and five verbal theory of mind 
tasks to a group of three- and four-year-olds in order to investigate how children perform on 
these different tasks, and how these tasks relate to each other. There are several reasons why 
this age group was chosen. The first reason for choosing three- and four-year-olds is that they 
generally manage to complete (either correctly or incorrectly) the verbal theory of mind tasks 
used in this study. Most of these tasks are too demanding for younger children and too easy 
for older children; hence three- and four-year-olds were chosen. Another reason why these 
two age groups were chosen is because previous research investigating theory of mind in 
young children found that an explicit theory of mind develops somewhere around the age of 
four (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer, 1987). Clements and 
Perner (1994) have furthermore suggested that an implicit theory of mind already develops 
around the age of three. The results of these studies suggest that children around the age of 
three and four years begin to develop the cognitive abilities necessary to pass these theory of 
mind tasks, making them an interesting group to study. A final reason for choosing these two 
age groups is that many studies using nonverbal theory of mind tasks have tested these tasks 
out on infants and two-year-olds (e.g. Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & 
Sperber, 2007; and Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). However, much is still unknown on how 
older age groups perform on nonverbal theory of mind tasks. Asking three- and four-year-olds 
to perform a nonverbal theory of mind task will therefore provide us with more information 
on how these age groups respond to this type of task. Hopefully, this will help enhance our 
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying theory of mind. 
 
The current study has several aims. The first aim is to test young children on a nonverbal 
transfer task that is very similar to the traditional transfer task, but which has been modified to 
account for the critique formulated with respect to prior nonverbal tasks. Critics of the 
nonverbal theory of mind task argued that children might be able to pass the nonverbal task 
by other means than having a theory of mind, namely by making three-way associations, 
using behavioral rules, or using situational cues. The nonverbal task used in this study does 
not have the three-way association problem because, as in the study by Southgate et al. 
(2007), children’s expectations are measured by recording their anticipatory looking behavior. 
Anticipatory looking is not influenced by three-way associations as it is recorded before the 
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actor attends to one side. Children might still make three-way associations, however, using 
this strategy will not help them pass the nonverbal task in this study, and can therefore not 
account for any possible findings. The nonverbal task in this study has also been modified in a 
way that discourages children from applying the behavioral rule that people look for an object 
where they last saw it. This is achieved by randomizing the location where the protagonist 
will go to. The protagonist does not always go to the location where it last saw the object, 
disconfirming the behavioral rule that people always look for an object at a place where they 
last saw it. Finally, the nonverbal task used in this study also prevents children from using the 
situational cue of the actor leaving the scene to predict the actor’s behavior. This is achieved 
by keeping the actor visible to the child during the belief-induction phase on each trial. Just 
like in the study by Southgate et al. (2007), the actor does not leave the scene during the 
believe-induction phase, but only turns around. Because of this, children cannot use the 
disappearance of the actor during the belief-induction phase as a cue to predict the actor’s 
behavior. As a result of these modifications, the nonverbal task used in this study limits the 
possibility that children pass this task by other means than using a theory of mind.  
 
Another aim of this study is to investigate how different verbal theory of mind tasks relate to 
each other. Although many studies have used different verbal theory of mind tasks and have 
reported the ages at which children pass them, none have thoroughly investigated the 
relationship between the five different verbal theory of mind tasks used in this study. Because 
all of these tasks have been used in previous studies to assess the presence of a theory of mind 
in children, it is important to investigate how these tasks are related. Also, because the verbal 
theory of mind tasks used in this study measure different aspects of theory of mind, 
comparing the results of these tasks will hopefully enhance our knowledge of the mechanisms 
underlying the child’s theory of mind.  
 
A final aim of this study is to investigate how the traditional transfer task relates to a similar 
nonverbal transfer task. These tasks are very similar in structure, however, one requires the 
child to make a spontaneous nonverbal response (look in one direction) while the other 
requires the child to make an elicited-response (answer the test questions). This study will 
also investigate how the nonverbal transfer task is related to the other verbal theory of mind 
tasks used in this study. More and more researchers are using nonverbal tasks to measure 
theory of mind in young children and infants; however, it is still unclear whether these 
18 
 
 
nonverbal tasks measure the same construct as the verbal theory of mind tasks. Comparing the 
results of the nonverbal transfer task with the verbal theory of mind tasks will hopefully shed 
some light on the relationship between these different measures of theory of mind and 
enhance our understanding of how theory of mind develops.  
 
3. Method 
 
3.1 Participants 
 
Participants were 40 preschoolers from Oslo, recruited through day care centers and by mail. 
The sample included 20 three-year-olds (10 female; M = 40 months, SD = 2.1) and 20 four-
year-olds (11 female; M = 51 months, SD = 2.4). Three additional four-year-olds were 
excluded from the study due to poor attention in the nonverbal task. The study was approved 
by the local ethical committee, and written, informed consent was obtained from all parents or 
guardians. All parents and guardians were given 100 Norwegian kroner (NOK) to compensate 
for travel expenses.  
 
3.2 Design  
 
Each participant was tested in two different sessions about 10 days apart (M = 11.78 days, SD 
= 7.12). In the first session, a nonverbal transfer task was administered. In the second session 
a traditional transfer task, a non-animated transfer task, an unexpected content task, an 
appearance-reality task, and a perspective taking task were randomly administered.  
 
3.3 Measures 
 
The nonverbal transfer task. During the nonverbal transfer task the child was seated at 
approximately 150 centimeter from the scene. Gaze was measured using a Tobii X50 near 
infrared eye tracker. The complete scene was 120 centimeter wide and 45 centimeter high 
(43.6˚width × 17.1˚height) and contained two containers (one blue and one yellow) that were 21 
centimeter wide and 13 centimeter high (8.0˚width × 5.0˚height). The containers could open so 
that an object could be hidden in them; each box was positioned 19 centimeter from the center 
of the scene. The scene also contained a red wall (that served as an occluder for the doll) 
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positioned in the center of the scene that was 23 centimeter wide and 16 centimeter high 
(8.8˚width × 6.1˚height), and an open elevator in which the human-like doll could move up (so it 
was visible to the child) and down (so it was hidden behind the red wall). The task was acted 
out live with several human-like dolls which were 18 centimeter wide and 28 centimeter high 
(6.9˚  width × 10.7˚  height) and a small puppet, that was 8 centimeter wide and 10 centimeter high 
(3.1˚  width × 3.8˚  height), and looked like a young deer (‘Bambi’).  
 
The session included two familiarization trials and eight test trials. On the eight test trials, the 
story begins by introducing the child to one of the human-like dolls and Bambi. Following 
this, the doll asks Bambi to move from the center of the scene into one of the two containers. 
Bambi follows these instructions and moves into the container pointed out by the doll. The 
doll watches Bambi move into the container. In the true belief trials, the doll then keeps 
facing the scene with the two containers, while in the false belief trials the doll turns around 
(see Figure 1). Following this, Bambi moves from the original container to the container on 
 
Figure 1. The storyline of a false belief trial in the nonverbal transfer task. 
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the other side. The doll witnesses this transfer of location in the true belief trials, but not in the 
false belief trials as it is still turned around. After Bambi changes locations, the doll turns 
around again so it is facing the scene (in the false belief trials) or the doll stays sitting (in the 
true belief trials). The doll then moves down using the elevator (so it is hidden behind the red 
wall) and tells the child it is going to get Bambi. After approximately 2-3 seconds, the doll 
appears at the container where Bambi is positioned, or at the container where Bambi was 
originally sent to. 
 
The eight test trials were preceded by two familiarization trials in which Bambi does not 
changes location and where the doll always went to the correct location to find Bambi. These 
familiarization trials were performed to let the child get familiar with the test situation and to 
clarify the goal of the doll (to find Bambi) to the child. All children were shown the same 
eight test trials in a random order. Whether or not the doll could see Bambi transfer locations 
and thus had a false or true belief about the location of Bambi was counterbalanced between 
the trials. After every 2-3 trials the human-like doll was replaced by a different doll to 
maintain the child’s attention. Also, a short break was held after the first four test trials before 
continuing with the last four to maintain the child’s attention throughout the eight test trials. 
 
Data analysis of the nonverbal transfer task.  In the nonverbal transfer task, the child’s 
anticipatory looking behavior was recorded with the help of an eyetracker. It was expected 
that children with a theory of mind would anticipate the doll to search at the location where it 
believed Bambi was located, regardless of the actual location of Bambi. It was furthermore 
expected that children without a theory of mind would anticipate the actor to search at the 
location where Bambi was actually located, regardless of whether the actor believed the doll 
was located there or not. Children without a theory of mind were therefore expected to look at 
Bambi’s location in the true, as well as the false belief trials. Children with a theory of mind 
were expected to look at Bambi’s location in the true belief trials, but at the opposite location 
in the false belief trials. For each child, the video with the child’s looking behavior was 
exported and analyzed frame by frame (every 20 milliseconds) in the video analysis program 
VirtualDub. For each trial, it was recorded where the child fixated its gaze at during the time 
the doll was hidden behind the occluder. A gaze fixation had to last at least two seconds to be 
included and only the first fixation was recorded. Only fixations occurring in the two areas 
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indicated in Figure 2 were included, fixations at irrelevant areas (such as the top of the scene) 
were thus not analyzed.  
 
 
Figure 2. An overview of the relevant looking areas in the nonverbal transfer task. 
 
For each trial, it was analyzed whether the child’s first fixation was at the location where 
Bambi was hidden, or at the opposite location. For both the true and false belief trials the 
percentage of first fixations made by the child that were directed at Bambi’s location was then 
calculated, from here on named the fixation score. These two fixation scores, one for the true 
belief trials and one for the false belief trials, were then compared to analyze whether the 
children looked more at Bambi’s location in the true belief trials than in the false belief trials. 
 
To be able to compare the nonverbal task results with the results of the verbal tasks, a 
different score was calculated, from here on named the nonverbal score. Each child received a 
score of zero or one, based on the child’s individual looking behavior. The child received one 
point, and thus passed the nonverbal task, if he or she had more first gaze shifts towards 
Bambi’s location in the true belief trials than in the false belief trials. The child received no 
points, and thus failed the nonverbal task, if he or she had less or a similar amount of first 
gaze shifts towards Bambi’s location in true belief trials than in the false belief trials.  
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t child will look for the coins?” The child passed this task and received 
ne point if he or she answered that the other child would look in the wallet (or if the child 
pointed to the wallet).  
The traditional transfer task. The traditional transfer task (adopted from Clements & Perner, 
1994) was acted out live with two cups with lids (one orange and one blue), a penguin doll 
(Pingu), a bird doll (Anne), and a small toy fish. The cups were positioned on a table at whic
the child was sitting. The experimenter then either told the false belief or true belief story. In 
the false belief story the child sees Pingu putting a fish (that he wants to eat later) in o
the cups. He then yawns and moves to another location to sleep. The experimenter than asks 
the child if he or she remembers where the fish is located (the first control question). 
Following this Anne enters the scene. Anne finds the fish, moves it to the other cup, and then 
disappears again. By that time the experimenter asks the child another three control question
(‘Do you remember where Pingu put the fish?’, ‘Where is the fish now?’, and ‘Did Pingu see 
the fish being moved?’). Then Pingu wakes up, moves back to the scene, and tells the child 
that he is going to get his fish because he is hungry. The experimenter than asks the child the 
action prediction question; ‘Where do you think Pingu will look first?’, and the justificati
question: ‘Why do you think he will look there first?’. If the child answered incorrect to any
of the control questions the story would be repeated until the child answered the control 
questions correctly (with a maximum of three trials). If the child still answered the control 
questions incorrectly on the third trial the whole trial was counted as invalid. The true be
story (which served as a control condition) was similar to the false belief story except for one 
detail, in this version of the story Anne enters the scene before Pingu goes to sleep and 
consequently Pingu sees the fish being moved to the other cup. Each participant was told both 
the false belief and true belief story, in a counter-balanced order. The child passed this task 
a
both the false belief and true belief condition.  
 
The non-animated transfer task. In the non-animated transfer task (adopted from Melinder, 
Endestad, & Magnussen, 2006), the experimenter put an empty milk-box and a wallet with 
money on the table. The experimenter then opened the wallet and said: “Look, there are some
coins inside this wallet. But now, I do something strange. I put all of the coins into this milk
box.” Subsequently, the experimenter took the money out of the wallet and put it in the milk-
box and then continued: “When you have left this room, another child will enter the room. 
Where do you think tha
o
23 
 
 
) 
 with 
 did you 
 
is 
ental questions. The 
hild received half a point if it only correctly answered one question. 
 
t, 
 was then 
 with one point if the child answered correctly to 
oth the appearance and reality question.  
 
le, but 
it 
 
The unexpected content task. In this task (adopted from Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer, 1987
the children were shown a candy box (“Smarties”) and asked what they believed was in the 
box. The experimenter then opened the candy box and showed the child that it was filled
screws instead of candy. The screws would be put back in the box and the experimenter 
would ask the child the first experimental question: “Before I opened this box, what
believe was in there?” All answers referring to candy were considered correct. The 
experimenter would then ask the child the second experimental question: “When you have left 
this room, another child will enter the room. What do you think that child will believe is in the
box?” Once again, all answers related to candy were counted as correct. The child passed th
task and received one point if it responded ‘candy’ to the two experim
c
 
The appearance-reality task. In the appearance-reality task (adopted from Flavell, 1986) the 
experimenter presented the child with a doll that looked like a penguin but was actually a bear
dressed up like a penguin. The experimenter showed the child the penguin and asked: “What 
is this?” All answers related to penguin were counted as correct. If the child did not know the 
name of the animal the experimenter told the child that the animal was called a penguin. Nex
the experimenter would say: “But look what I do now!” While saying this, the experimenter 
removed the penguin suit, revealing that the doll was really a teddy-bear. The child
asked: “So what is this?” All answers related to bear were counted as correct. The 
experimenter than put the penguin dress back on the bear and asked the child one reality 
question (“What is this really, a penguin or a bear?”) and one appearance question (“What 
does it look like, a penguin or a bear?”) of which the order was counterbalanced between the 
children. This task was passed and awarded
b
 
The perspective taking task. In this task (adopted from Melinder, Endestad, & Magnussen,
2006) an obstacle (a package of paper napkins) was placed on the centre of the table. The 
child was then given a small blue wooden block and asked to place the block on the tab
out of sight from the experimenter. The experimenter turned around and the child was 
instructed to place the block on the table so that the experimenter would not be able to see 
when turning back around again. The child passed this part of the task if he or she put the 
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4. Results 
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ials (M = 57.78, SD = 31.31). No main or interaction effects were found with 
ge as a factor.  
of 
lthough indicating a trend, this difference was not significant, 
38) = -1.95, p > .05, d = .062. 
block on the table out of sight of the experimenter (behind the obstacle). In the second part of 
this task, the experimenter took the wooden block and told the child that he or she had to tell 
whether the experimenter could see the block. The experimenter would then place the block at 
three different locations, one time under the table, one time on the table behind the obstacle
that only the child could see it and one time on the table in front of the obstacle so that the 
block was only visible to the researcher. Each time the child was asked whether the research
could see the wooden block. The child passed this part of the task if he or she answered all 
three questions correctly. The child wa
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The first aim of this study was to investigate how three- and four-year-olds perform on a 
modified nonverbal theory of mind task. During the familiarization trials, 14 of the 20 three-
year-olds, and 18 of the 20 four-year-olds looked consistently at the correct side. The other 
eight children looked either at both directions, or into the wrong direction. However, becaus
a preliminary analysis showed that these children did not do significantly worse on the t
trials, they were not excluded from further analysis. The children’s fixation scores (the 
percentage of first fixations at Bambi’s location) were analyzed using a two-way analysis
variance with age and belief type as factors. A significant main effect (see Figure 3) was 
found for belief type (F(1,76) = 6.66, p < .05, eta2 = .081), indicating that the children looked
more often at the location of Bambi in the true belief trials (M = 73.97, SD = 24.89) than in 
the false belief tr
a
 
Analysis of the nonverbal score of the children showed that 40 percent of the three-year-olds, 
and 70 percent of the four-year-olds had a looking behavior pattern consistent with a theory 
mind (they looked more at Bambi in the true belief trials than in the false belief trials), and 
thus passed the nonverbal task (see Figure 4). More four-year old passed the nonverbal task 
than three-year-olds, however, a
t(
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Figure 3. The fixations scores on the true and false belief trials. Error bars represent 
tandard errors. * Indicates a significant difference (p < .05). 
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The second aim of this study was to investigate how three- and four-year-olds perform on
different verbal theory of mind tasks and to explore how these tasks relate to each other. 
Figure 4 summarizes the results of the different theory of mind tasks. The effect of age on the  
verbal theory of mind tasks was examined using a two-way analysis of variance with the scor
on each task as a within-subjects factor and age as a between-subjects factor. As can be seen 
in Figure 4 there was a main effect of age (F(1,34)= 4.39, p<0.05, eta2 = .114 ), with the four
year-olds scoring better on the verbal theory of mind tasks than the three-year-olds. A main 
effect for task was also found (F(4,136)=19.67, p<0.05, eta2 = .367). Post-hoc tests (t-test, p <
.05) revealed that the children’s scores on all of the verbal tasks were significantly different 
from each other, except for the score on the non-animated transfer task and the unexpected 
c
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Figure 4. Average score per age group on the different theory of mind tasks. TTT  is the 
traditional transfer task, NATT  is  the non-animated transfer task, UCT is the unexpected 
content task, ART is the appearance-reality task, PTT is the perspective taking task, and 
NVTT is the nonverbal transfer task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
To investigate the relations between the different verbal theory of mind tasks, correlations 
were computed between the scores while controlling for age. A significant correlation was 
found between the non-animated transfer task and the unexpected content task (r(34) = .42, p 
< .05) as well as the unexpected content task and the perspective taking task (r(34) = .37, p < 
.05). The scores on the other tasks were not reliably correlated. However, significance might 
not have been reached due to the low variability in response scores on some of the theory of 
mind tasks (see Fig. 4). For that reason, a new analysis was carried out in which two groups 
were formed, one high-scoring group composed of the children who received one point in the 
unexpected content task and one low-scoring group composed of the children who received 
no points on this task. The unexpected content task was chosen for this split because this task 
was of average difficulty; around half of the children failed this task while the other half past 
it. It was then tested whether the high-scoring group on the unexpected content task also 
scored higher on the other verbal theory of mind tasks. Results indicated that the high-scoring 
three-year-olds scored significantly higher on the other verbal theory of mind tasks (M = 2.07, 
SD = 0.84) than the low-scoring three-year-olds (M = 1.28, SD = 0.83, p < .05, d = .95, one-
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tailed t-test). A similar result was found for the four-year-olds; those in the high-scoring group 
scored significantly higher on the other tasks (M = 3.29, SD = 0.76) than those in the low-
scoring group (M = 2.00, SD = 0.65, p < .05, d = 1.82, one-tailed t-test). These results show 
that children who passed the unexpected content task did better on the other theory of mind 
tasks as well, demonstrating a clear relationship between the different verbal theory of mind 
scores. 
 
4.3 Relationship between the nonverbal and verbal theory of mind tasks 
 
A third aim of this study was to investigate how the nonverbal transfer task relates to the 
verbal theory of mind tasks. First it was analyzed whether the children’s looking behavior on 
the nonverbal transfer task was correlated to the children’s score on the traditional transfer 
task. Correlation analysis showed that the traditional transfer task was not correlated to the 
nonverbal transfer task (p > .05). However, a likely reason why no correlation was found 
between the verbal and nonverbal transfer task is that not so many children passed the verbal 
transfer task (no three-year-olds and only twenty percent of the four-year-olds passed this 
task). Another analysis was performed to investigate whether the nonverbal transfer task was 
correlated to the verbal theory of mind tasks. Two groups were formed, one composed of the 
children that passed the nonverbal transfer task and one composed of the children who failed 
this task. Results showed that children who passed the nonverbal task did not score 
significantly higher on the verbal tasks than children who did not pass the nonverbal task (t-
test, p > .05). Correlation analysis furthermore showed that the nonverbal task was not 
correlated to any of the verbal theory of mind tasks (all p > .05). 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Several studies have been carried out over the past few decades in order to investigate how 
and when theory of mind develops in children. Many of them have used nonverbal theory of 
mind tasks to investigate whether a theory of mind is present in infants and young children. 
Some of these studies claim to have found evidence suggesting infants possess a theory of 
mind (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). However, others argue that these nonverbal tasks can 
be passed without using a theory of mind (e.g. Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Even though many 
of these studies have been performed on infants and young children, it is still largely unknown 
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how older children perform on these nonverbal theory of mind tasks that often use eye-
tracking as a mean to determine whether a child or infant possesses a theory of mind. The 
present study aimed to complement the existing theory of mind literature by administering an 
altered version of the nonverbal transfer task to a group of three- and four-year-olds. This 
nonverbal transfer task was almost identical to the traditional transfer task, and its design 
limited the possibility that children passed it by other means than using a theory of mind. 
Furthermore were five verbal theory of mind tasks administered of which the results were 
compared to the nonverbal transfer task and to each other in order to investigate the 
relationship between the different tasks. The three main aims of this study were (1) to 
investigate how three- and four-year-olds perform on a modified nonverbal transfer task, (2) 
to describe the relationship between the different verbal theory of mind tasks used in this 
study, and (3) to explore how the nonverbal transfer task relates to other verbal theory of mind 
tasks. The conclusions that follow from the results of this study are discussed below. 
 
5.1 Three- and four-year-olds’ nonverbal theory of mind 
 
Results of the nonverbal transfer task showed that children looked more at the position where 
Bambi was currently hiding in both the true and false belief trials (see Figure 3). This result 
was not unexpected, since the presence of Bambi at one location probably made that location 
more attractive to look at. However, when the fixation scores were compared between the true 
and false belief trials, it was found that children looked significantly more at Bambi’s location 
in the true belief trials compared to the false belief trials. Whether or not the doll in the story 
had seen that Bambi moved to another location thus had a significant effect on the looking 
behavior of the children. Children expected the actor to move to Bambi’s original hiding 
location more often when the doll ‘believed’ that Bambi was still there than when it ‘believed’ 
that it was at the other location. Both the three- and four-year-olds showed this behavior 
pattern. Critics of previous nonverbal theory of mind tasks argued that children and infants 
may pass these tasks by other means than using a theory of mind. This study modified the 
nonverbal transfer task to account for these critiques.  
 
The nonverbal transfer task was modified in such a way that discouraged children from using 
the behavioral rule “people look for an object where they last saw it”. In half of the trials the 
children in this study witnessed the doll going to the wrong location, disconfirming this 
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behavioral rule several times. As a consequence, the reported results were probably not 
caused by children using this behavioral rule. This study was designed in way that enforced 
the idea that people do not always look for an object where they last saw it.  Children should 
therefore not have used this rule to predict the actor’s behavior. The results of the nonverbal 
task are therefore probably not the result of children using this behavioral rule. 
 
The children of this study could also not have passed this task by making three-way 
associations since the results are based on anticipatory looking behavior. Perner and Ruffman 
(2005) argued that the infants in the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) may have passed 
the task by forming three-way associations between the actor, object, and location of the 
actor. They argued that these three-way associations were formed during the familiarization 
trials, and later activated during the test trials, influencing the looking behavior of the infants. 
More specifically, they argued that the children would look longer at the actor when the actor-
object-location configuration was different from the one just encoded in the familiarization 
trial, and shorter when the actor-object-location configuration was similar to the one in the 
familiarization trial. This study used a similar predictive looking behavior paradigm as the 
study by Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007), recording the child’s looking behavior at the 
moment the doll disappeared behind the occluder. This measure is not influenced by three-
way associations as it is not based on looking times but the looking direction of the child. 
Furthermore was the looking direction of the child measured before the doll went to one of 
the locations, and therefore independent of any possible three-way associations formed by the 
child. Thus, because children’s predictive looking behavior was used to measure theory of 
mind, and not violation of expectation, the three-way association theory cannot account for 
the findings of this study.  
 
Another critique of nonverbal theory of mind studies is that the disappearance of the actor in 
the false belief trials might cue the child and consequently influence its looking behavior. This 
task was modified so that the actor never disappeared from the scene during the belief-
induction phase. Similarly as in the study by Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007), the actor 
does not disappear, but only turns around during the belief-induction phase. The actor 
disappearing from the scene could therefore not have served as a cue for the child to predict 
the actor’s behavior. Accordingly, the results of the nonverbal theory of mind task used in this 
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study cannot be explained by the children using the situational cue of the actor leaving the 
scene.   
 
The children of this study changed their looking behavior based on the beliefs of the human-
like doll. The nonverbal transfer task was modified to minimize the possibility that children 
passed it by other means then applying a theory of mind. The results of this study therefore 
indicate that three- and four-year-olds understand that an actor can have a false belief and that 
its behavior can be influenced by this belief. These findings replicate the results of the study 
by Clements and Perner (1994), showing that three- and four-year-olds have a theory of mind. 
The results of this nonverbal transfer task thus shows that three- and four-year-olds can 
impute a false belief to an actor and predict its behavior based on this belief.  
 
5.2 The relationship between the different tasks 
 
A comparison of the different tasks used in this study showed that the unexpected content task 
was correlated with the non-animated transfer task as well as the perspective taking task and 
that children who passed the unexpected content task tended to score better on the other 
verbal tasks than children who did not pass this task. These findings suggest that the verbal 
tasks used in this study are measuring a similar construct, namely the presence of a theory of 
mind. This study found no significant relationship between the nonverbal transfer task and the 
traditional transfer task. This lack of correlation may have been caused by the flooring effects 
of the traditional transfer task, however, the nonverbal transfer task was not correlated with 
any of the other verbal tasks either. These results suggest that there is no relationship between 
the nonverbal transfer task and the verbal theory of mind tasks. This idea is furthermore 
supported by the finding that performance on the nonverbal task was not related to the total 
score on the verbal theory of mind tasks. One possible way to interpret these results is to 
suggest that the nonverbal theory of mind task and/or the verbal theory of mind tasks do not 
measure theory of mind, and consequently do not correlate. However, I would like to argue 
that these tasks do measure theory of mind, but that no correlation is found between the 
nonverbal and verbal tasks because the results on these tasks are highly dependent on other, 
non theory of mind related abilities that differ between the tasks.  
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The results of the traditional transfer task and the nonverbal transfer task support this idea. 
Around half of the children passed the nonverbal transfer task, but failed the traditional 
transfer task which measures the same theory of mind abilities, namely the ability to impute a 
false belief to another agent and to predict the agent’s behavior based on its beliefs. It is not 
likely that the children that passed the nonverbal transfer task suddenly lack a theory of mind 
when tested on the traditional transfer task. The only other logical explanation is therefore that 
the children that passed the nonverbal theory of mind task do have a theory of mind but that 
they failed the traditional transfer task because this task requires some additional, non theory 
of mind related, abilities. One main difference between these tasks is that verbal task requires 
the child to make an elicited-response, while the nonverbal task requires the child to make a 
spontaneous response. Scott and Baillargeon (in press) argued that children may have 
difficulty with elicited-response tasks such as the traditional transfer task because their limited 
information-processing abilities cannot process the false belief representation and response-
selection process simultaneously. Spontaneous response tasks such as the nonverbal transfer 
task do not require children to make an explicit response and are therefore cognitively less 
demanding. As a consequence, no correlation may have been found between the nonverbal 
and verbal tasks as there are other factors beside theory of mind, such as linguistic abilities 
and cognitive processing skills, which influence the outcomes of these tasks. The verbal 
theory of mind tasks all require a similar, elicited, response, which could explain why a 
relationship was found between these tasks, but not between the nonverbal transfer task and 
the verbal theory of mind tasks.  
 
5.3 The developmental trajectory of theory of mind  
 
The results of this study showed that four-year-olds scored significantly better on the verbal 
theory of mind tasks than the three-year-olds. These results confirm the findings of previous 
studies showing that four-year-olds do generally better on verbal theory of mind tasks than 
three-year-olds (e.g. Clements & Perner, 1994; Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1983; Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). The results of this study furthermore showed that three- and four-year-olds 
passed some theory of mind tasks, but failed others. Some of the theory of mind tasks used in 
this study were thus easier to perform than others which could shed some light on the 
developmental trajectory of theory of mind.  
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Most of the children in this study passed the perspective taking task which shows that children 
at this age understand that people can have a different perspective of the world from 
themselves. They also passed the appearance-reality task, which demonstrates that they can 
hold two different mental representations at the same time and are able to distinguish between 
an external (what the object looks like) and internal (what the object really is) representation.  
 
The results of the unexpected content task and the non-animated transfer task showed that 
around half of the children in this study understood that reality can be distinct from one’s own 
(past) beliefs as well as the beliefs of another person and that a person’s behavior can be 
influenced by his or her beliefs. Scott and Baillargeon (in press) suggested that young children 
may fail theory of mind tasks not because they have difficulty representing false beliefs, but 
because they have trouble inhibiting their own knowledge of reality. These tasks showed that 
most children in this study can inhibit their own knowledge when making judgments about 
another person’s beliefs, as well as their own past beliefs, and are able to hold two different 
representations of a certain situation simultaneously. 
 
The results of the nonverbal transfer task demonstrated that more than half of the children in 
this study were able to attribute false beliefs to an animated actor and to implicitly, by shifting 
their gaze to a location, predict the actor’s behavior based on its beliefs about the location of 
an object. The finding that many three-and four-year-olds passed this task furthermore shows 
that these children were able to follow the storyline of this transfer task, and were able to 
attribute a false or true belief to the actor based on the actor’s visual view of the scene.  
 
Almost all children failed the traditional transfer task, which is surprising considering it is not 
so very different from the nonverbal and non-animated transfer tasks. In order to pass this task 
a child needs to understand that another person can have a false belief and that this false belief 
influences the person’s behavior, which most children demonstrated to understand in the 
nonverbal and non-animated transfer task. One difference between the traditional transfer task 
and the non-animated transfer task, and a possible reason why the children failed the 
traditional transfer task, is that this task is played out with dolls while the non-animated 
transfer task is not. It could be the case that children find it easier to attribute mental states to 
real people than to dolls. However, around half of the children passed the nonverbal transfer 
task which was also acted out with inanimate objects. If the children of this study failed the 
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traditional transfer task because they were unable to attribute mental states to inanimate 
objects, then they should also have failed the nonverbal transfer task. However, many passed 
the nonverbal transfer task, making it unlikely that the children in this study failed the 
traditional transfer task because they had difficulty attributing mental states to an inanimate 
object. Another possible reason why children fail the traditional transfer task, but not the non-
animated transfer task is that in the non-animated transfer task the actor (who the child has to 
predict the behavior of) is not present at all, while in the traditional transfer task the actor is 
present most of the time. Although this seems to make the task easier at first sight because 
theorizing about the mind of another person who is not even there in the room seems more 
difficult than theorizing about the mind of an actor who is present, this might not be the case. 
In the non-animated transfer task the child has to predict the actions of another person who 
has not been present at the scene at all. In this task, the child needs to understand that the 
person was not there, therefore has a false belief, and consequently acts incorrectly. In the 
traditional transfer task the child is asked to predict the actions of an actor who has been 
present half of the time. In order to pass this task, the child has to remember what the actor 
did and did not see, attribute a belief to the actor based on this information, and predict the 
actor’s behavior based on its mental state. This task thus requires one additional step; the 
child has to remember what the actor knows in order to make a correct judgment. This 
additional step might overload the information-processing capacity of young children, 
consequently making the task more difficult to pass.  
 
The finding that more children pass the nonverbal transfer task than the traditional transfer 
task supports the idea that children fail the traditional transfer task because they have a limited 
information-processing capacity. Although these two tasks are very similar, having to give a 
verbal, elicited, response is, as mentioned before, probably more cognitively demanding than 
giving a nonverbal spontaneous response, causing more children to pass the nonverbal 
transfer task than the traditional transfer task. Supporting the idea that information-processing 
abilities play an important role in children’s performance on theory of mind tasks is the 
finding that three-, four-, and five-year olds’ ability to carry out concurrent mental activities is 
related to theory of mind performance (Gordon & Oslon, 1998). Furthermore supporting this 
suggestion is a previous finding that three-year-olds perform significantly worse on dual-
processing tasks than four-year-olds (Gordon & Oslon, 1988). This could explain why the 
four-year-olds in this study performed better on the theory of mind tasks than the three-year-
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olds. It is thus very likely that as children improve on their information-processing abilities, 
they begin passing more complex theory of mind tasks. This would explain why children 
scored so differently on different tasks and why almost none of the children passed the 
traditional transfer task. Compared to the other tasks, the traditional transfer task has a high 
cognitive load because in order to pass it, one has to remember the storyline, what the actor 
did and did not see and give an explicit response. This task thus requires more use of 
information-processing resources than the other tasks, in which the children have to remember 
less information and/or do not have to give an explicit response.  
 
In summary, the results of the verbal and nonverbal theory of mind tasks indicate that three- 
and four-year-olds understand that their representation of reality is not always similar to that 
of other people. Around half of them were also able to predict another person’s behavior 
based on the person’s beliefs. The three- and four-year-olds in this study were able to 
represent mental states and around half of them were able to predict a person’s behavior based 
on his or her mental representation, showing that they have a theory of mind. However, most 
of them failed the traditional transfer task, which is surprising considering the results of the 
other theory of mind tasks showed that many of these children have a theory of mind. Other 
mental processes, beside theory of mind, must therefore have influenced the results of the 
traditional transfer task. Verbal abilities may play an important role, however, most children 
were able to answer similar verbal questions in other tasks such as the non-animated transfer 
task. It was therefore suggested that children’s information-processing abilities largely 
determine their performance on theory of mind tasks. Most children in this study 
demonstrated to have theory of mind understanding but nonetheless failed the more difficult 
traditional transfer task. Most likely, their information-processing skills were not developed 
enough yet to pass this task. This suggestion is in line with the modular theory of theory of 
mind, which states that children are born with a theory of mind module, and thus have a 
theory of mind, but fail theory of mind tasks because they lack abilities in other areas. The 
finding that most four-year-olds and many three-year-olds showed to have a fully developed 
theory of mind, yet failed the traditional transfer task supports this theory. This shows that 
they did not fail the traditional transfer task because they did not have a theory of mind, but 
because they lack abilities in other areas. Once children develop themselves in these other 
areas, such as their information-processing skills, their performance on the traditional transfer 
task will most likely improve as well. 
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5.4 Limitations 
 
Several limitations of this study should be recognized. During the nonverbal transfer task the 
doll did not always search at the location where it believed Bambi was hiding in order to 
avoid children using the behavioral rule: ‘people look for an object where they last saw it’. 
However, it could be that children continued using this rule, even though the doll acted 
incorrectly in half of the trials. If this is the case, the children of this study may have passed 
the nonverbal theory of mind task by using the rule ‘the doll searches for Bambi where it last 
saw it’. This does not require a theory of mind, only the ability to remember where the doll 
saw Bambi last. In everyday life, it is probably more likely that a child sees another person 
looking for an object at a location where he or she last saw it than at another location. It could 
be the case that this behavioral rule, learned from experiences in daily life, cannot be modified 
so easily. Further research examining whether young children use this rule, and, if so, how 
resistant to change this rule is necessary to rule out this alternative explanation of the looking 
behavior results of the nonverbal transfer task.  
 
The nonverbal transfer task used in this study was designed in a way so that children could 
not use the situational cue of the actor leaving the scene to predict the actor’s behavior.  
However, the actor did turn around at the moment the actor’s belief was induced in half of the 
trials, which could still have served as a cue to help predict the actor’s behavior. Although the 
action of the actor turning around is a less obvious cue than the actor disappearing 
completely, this study cannot rule out the possibility that the children in this study used this 
cue to help predict the actor’s behavior. However, many children made correct action 
predictions in the first test trial they witnessed, suggesting that children did not learned to 
associate this situational cue with the actor’s behavior during the experiment. If children used 
this situational cue to predict the actor’s behavior they thus should have learned to make this 
association somewhere else. It is not very likely that children in their every-day life have 
learned that ‘people who have just turned around act incorrect’. Still, this alternative 
explanation cannot be ruled out completely without further research. 
 
Another limitation of this study is that only three- and four-year-olds were tested on the 
theory of mind tasks used in this study. The perspective taking task was passed by almost all 
children, and was therefore probably too easy for this age group, while the traditional transfer 
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task used in this study was passed by only a few children and therefore probably too difficult 
for this age group.  These near-flooring and ceiling effects made it difficult to interpret some 
of the results found. In order to make a better estimation of the age at which children pass 
these tasks future research should use a sample with a broader age range.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The results of this study suggest that three-, and four-year-olds have a theory of mind but 
nevertheless have problems passing the traditional transfer task. This failure does not stem 
from their inability to inhibit their own representation of reality when this is incongruent with 
someone else’s representation or their own past representation, as shown by the unexpected 
content and non-animated transfer task. It was therefore argued that their failure on the 
traditional transfer task is most likely the result of the limited information-processing capacity 
of three- and four-year olds. This conclusion is supported by the finding that most children 
failed the traditional transfer task, but passed the nonverbal transfer task, which are very 
similar, but require a different response type. Having to give a spontaneous response is most 
likely cognitively less demanding than having to give an elicited response; hence more 
children failed the traditional transfer task. Also more children failed the traditional transfer 
task than the non-animated transfer task, of which the latter is cognitively less demanding 
because it does not require the child to remember what the other person did or did not see of 
the event shown. The children of this study did not fail the traditional transfer task because 
they lack a theory of mind, but because this task requires additional skills to be passed that the 
children of this study probably had not yet fully developed. In conclusion, this study suggests 
that theory of mind develops before the age of four and that children around the age of three 
fail the traditional transfer task because they have not fully developed other abilities necessary 
to pass this task, most likely their information-processing abilities.  
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